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Abstract: 
The statement “institutions matter” has become commonplace. A precondition for 
it to be supported by empirical evidence, is, however, that institutions are 
measurable. Glaeser et al. (2004) attacks many studies claiming to prove the 
relevance of institutions for economic development as being based on flawed 
measures of institutions, or not even on institutions at all. This paper shows that 
their criticism deserves to be taken seriously, but that it is somewhat overblown. 
Some of the difficulties in measuring institutions are described and some ways of 
measuring them are proposed. 
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How (Not) to Measure Institutions 
1 Introduction 
That “institutions matter” is a self-evident truth for some, a mantra for new institutional 
economists, and a robust empirical insight for others.1 Over the last decade, dozens of 
empirical papers purporting to present evidence in support of the claim have been 
published. A more precise version of the phrase might be that “institutions matter 
crucially for economic development.” This claim has always been attacked by 
researchers who stress the dominance of geography (e.g., Jeffrey Sachs; see McArthur 
and Sachs 2001). Recently, the claim has been attacked from another angle, arguing that 
many—if not most—empirical studies purporting to show the crucial relevance of 
institutions are based on flawed, if not entirely false, indicators for institutions (e.g. 
Glaeser et al. 2004). 
Saying that “institutions matter” implies that, due to the existence of institutions, actors 
behave differently than they would in the absence of institutions or in the presence of 
different institutions. For the statement to be meaningful, two preconditions must be 
satisfied. First, it must be realized that the universe is comprised of more than just 
“institutions”; otherwise, the statement is trivial. At times, is seems as though the term 
“institution” is all encompassing. In the literature, newspapers, supermarkets, and even 
phone booths have been described as institutions. Often, no explicit distinction is made 
between institutions and organizations (like firms, churches, governments, etc.). The 
second precondition arises once a conceptual distinction is made between institutions 
and noninstitutions: it must be possible to empirically ascertain institutions; otherwise, 
it is impossible to show their relevance empirically and saying “institutions matter” 
cannot be proven in any substantiated way. 
This paper presents a number of proposals on how to measure institutions empirically. It 
is thus not another paper trying to “prove” that institutions do or do not matter; rather, it 
is a discussion of how to measure institutions in the first place. Only if institutions can 
be measured with a minimum degree of confidence are empirical statements such as 
“institutions matter for y” credible. There are many ways of delineating institutions; 
                                                 
1    The extent to which the claim that “institutions matter” has become commonplace is 
remarkable. Only two decades ago, some textbooks proudly claimed that economic effects 
were truly independent of any institutional background and for a long time, growth theory 
ignored outright the possibility that institutions might have an effect on growth.   3
however, a minimum degree of agreement on what exactly an institution is must be 
reached before trying to measure them. 
The main points of this contribution are: (1) measures of institutions should refer to 
specific institutions because aggregate measures such as “the rule of law” are too broad 
and fuzzy to contain meaningful information, (2) objective measures are generally 
preferable over subjective measures, (3) one should always aim at measuring the 
institution as formally specified in legislation (de jure) and as factually implemented (de 
facto), and finally (4) the ability to measure institutions does not imply the ability to 
create and modify institutions at will. Institutional optimism—or even institutional 
naiveté—will lead to disappointment and might even result in throwing out the baby 
(the New Institutional Economics) with the bathwater. 
The next section of the paper presents and critically evaluates the attack that Glaeser et 
al. (2004) have launched against empirical studies that include institutional measures as 
explanatory variables. Section 3 proposes a definition for the term “institution.” Section 
4 provides some bits and pieces of institutional theory. Section 5 sets forth several 
pragmatic proposals for measuring institutions. Section 6 contains a number of 
examples of flawed attempts at measurement. Section 7 concludes. 
2 Have We Been Measuring Policies All These Years? 
Glaeser et al. (2004) is an attack on the New Institutional Economics (NIE) containing 
the reproach that much of the empirical work purporting to measure the economic 
effects of institutions has not been measuring institutions at all, but rather policies. The 
authors present and evaluate two competing views on economic growth. In the first, 
“democracy and other checks on government” serve as mechanisms to secure property 
rights, which spurs investment and, eventually, income and growth—the institutional 
view.2 According to the competing view, increased levels of human capital lead to more 
benign politics, less violence, and more political stability, which in turn lead to more 
secure property rights. In that view, better institutions are not a prerequisite to economic 
growth, but its consequence. The authors end up endorsing the second view but are 
careful enough not to break entirely with the first one (“The results of this paper do not 
show that ‘institutions do not matter.’ That proposition is flatly contradicted by a great 
                                                 
2   Many scholars would, however, stress the importance of various aspects of the rule of law 
rather than the relevance of democracy (e.g., Barro 2000). The debate on whether democracy 
leads to growth or vice versa has been going on ever since Lipset (1959), but has remained 
largely inconclusive (Sunde 2006 is a recent survey).   4
deal of available empirical evidence … Rather, our results suggest that the current 
measurement strategies have conceptual flaws, and that researchers would do better 
focusing on actual laws, rules, and compliance procedures that could be manipulated by 
a policy maker to assess what works.”).3
What, precisely, are the conceptual flaws in the measurement of institutions that Glaeser 
et al. identify? Drawing on a standard definition of institutions, they stress two chief 
characteristics of institutions: (1) that they constrain behavior and (2) that they are 
permanent or stable. Some of the frequently used measures (they cite the International 
Country Risk Guide, the Governance Indicators of the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 
2003), and the Polity IV measures) would neither measure policy constraints nor would 
they be stable; they would rather measure outcomes, i.e., policy choices.4 To make 
matters worse, the subjectivity of these measures makes it very likely that improved 
scores are not due to the institution being improved, but simply based on an increase in 
income. But if their ascertainment is influenced by income levels, they are not an 
adequate measure for explaining changes in income levels. 
The critique of measuring institutions is well taken. Yet, some of the reasoning appears 
no less flawed than the measures being criticized. If the indicators used to proxy for 
institutions are inadequate, then these proxies are, as Glaeser et al. argue, inadequate to 
support the hypothesis that institutions are a prerequisite for economic growth. But if 
the indicators are not good proxies for institutions, they are equally poor at supporting 
the hypothesis that good institutions are the consequence, rather than the prerequisite, of 
economic development. 
                                                 
3   I confine the discussion to the measurement issue but cannot quite resist pointing out that 
the level of human capital is, itself, a consequence of institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2005) 
show that Glaeser et al.’s (2004) endorsement of the second view does not fit the facts. 
Acemoglu et al. (2007) demonstrate that the evidence in favor of the so-called modernization 
hypothesis formulated by Lipset (1959) completely vanishes if country fixed effects proxying 
for historical influences are taken into account. 
4   It is useful to keep in mind that most institutions make a number of theoretically possible 
behavioral options more costly. However, this does not imply that most institutions would 
reduce the action space to just one possible option. In other words, there are choices within 
constraints. Glaeser et al. (2004) seem to assume otherwise: “These measures do not code 
dictators who choose to respect property rights any differently than democratically elected 
leaders who have no choice but to respect them.” It seems, however, reasonable to assume 
that even democratic governments have some discretion in the degree to which they honor 
private property rights.   5
How do Glaeser et al. propose to measure institutions properly? Unfortunately, their 
paper contains some general observations, but no concrete proposals. According to 
them, constitutional rules are likely to constrain behavior and be permanent. Yet, they 
note (ibid., 276) that “it is possible that these constitutional measures are noisy, and it is 
certain that ‘rules on the books’ are very different from what actually takes place in a 
country. But this is precisely the point: the institutional outcomes that scholars have 
used as measures of constraints have very little to do with the constitutional constraints, 
raising doubts about the effectiveness of changing political rules.” 
Here, Glaeser et al. conflate a number of propositions. They first make the point that de 
jure and de facto are often worlds apart. We could not agree more. The next sentence 
supposedly uses constitutional rules as a benchmark and then notes that those measures 
of institutions that Glaeser et al. criticize are often only very loosely correlated with 
constitutional rules. But if de jure and de facto are often worlds apart, one can also 
argue that measuring de jure constitutional rules will not teach us anything about the 
factual constraints of the real world. And if constitutional rules are useless as a 
benchmark, why should we measure them? At the end of the day, their entire argument 
seems to be motivated by the possibility that changing these constraints will not 
necessarily lead to the intended changes in outcomes. This conflates positive economics 
with the “art of economics” (à la John Neville Keynes 1955). To test whether de jure 
and de facto deviate, we first need to be able to measure both de jure and de facto. 
Second, given that we have measured both and we find that they do deviate, we would 
want to know under what conditions de jure institutions are factually implemented and 
under what conditions they are not. All this is part of positive economics, which tries to 
explain certain phenomena. This undertaking would be justified even if it was 
impossible to change the rules in order to change the outcomes. 
The constitutional variables that Glaeser et al. suggest as more appropriate benchmarks 
for long-term constraints are: two dealing with electoral systems (“plurality” and 
“proportional representation”) and two dealing with judicial constraints on government, 
namely, judicial independence (JI) and constitutional review. The first two measures are 
motivated by the work of Persson and Tabellini (2003) and the last two are taken from 
La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Pop Eleches, and Shleifer (2004). Judicial independence is 
the average of three components: (1) the tenure of highest ordinary court judges, (2) the 
tenure of administrative court judges, and (3) a dummy coded 1 if judicial decisions are 
a binding source of law. Constitutional review is the sum of (1) the rigidity of the 
constitution and (2) the extent of judicial review (none, limited, full). These measures 
are praised as “objective”—and, indeed, they are. Glaeser et al. find that “the measures 
of judicial checks and balances—judicial independence and constitutional review—are 
uncorrelated with per capita income, and only JI is weakly correlated with outcome   6
indices.” The authors thus state two conclusions. First, the two objective measures for 
constitutional constraints are only weakly, if at all, correlated with the institutional 
measures that Glaeser et al. criticize, which they appear to believe is sufficient evidence 
for the inferiority of the institutional measures they criticize. But they do not stop there. 
They argue, second, that neither of the preferred objective measures is correlated with 
income, appearing to believe that this is a sufficient foundation for the claim that 
institutions do not cause growth. 
These arguments are unconvincing for a number of reasons: 
(1) I do not know of any theory claiming that any of the four constitutional measures is 
sufficient for observing economic growth. 
(2) The two judicial measures rely exclusively on de jure information and hence may 
not accurately reflect the real world.5
(3) The two electoral measures are averages for the period 1975 to 2000, whereas the 
two judicial measures are intended to reflect the situation in 1995. Their dependent 
variable, economic growth, is, however, the average for the period 1960 to 2000. It 
would be truly amazing were they to find that a constitutional rule claimed to be valid in 
1995 caused growth that started three and half decades before! 
(4) They do not sufficiently distinguish between procedural and substantive aspects of 
institutions, apparently subscribing to the idea that a high number of constraints on the 
executive (a procedural aspect) translates into secure property rights (a substantive 
aspect). After noting that a commonly used measure for the level of democracy (Polity 
IV) attributes the worst scores to dictatorships such as those in Cuba and North Korea 
and also to Pinochet’s Chile, but that communist countries, including China and the 
USSR, fare better, they state (Glaeser et al. 2004, 277): “It is difficult to see how 
property is more secure in Mao’s China than in Pinochet’s Chile.” But why should a 
high number of procedural constraints quasi-automatically translate into secure property 
rights? During Mao’s tenure, securing private property rights was considered 
antithetical to the whole communist ideal. In other words: mechanically counting 
                                                 
5   Their coding is crude and distinguishes only between tenure that is less than six years (coded 
0), tenure longer than six years but less than life (coded 1), and lifelong tenure (2). Whether 
“lifelong” means until death or until a fixed retirement age is not mentioned. Witold Henisz 
(2000) has constructed a variable that captures the de facto tenure of supreme court judges 
with very high precision. The correlation between his variable and the tenure variable 
constructed by Glaeser et al. is only 0.366.   7
constraints on the executive is not a good proxy for the security of private property if 
the underlying ideology of the executive’s country is completely ignored. 
(5) Finally, Glaeser et al. (2004, 274f.) note that “[i]f the experience of poor countries in 
the last 50 years is a guide, politically constrained government may not be a viable 
strategy for them to secure property rights.” The authors seem to believe that this 
insight is incompatible with the NIE, but that is not necessarily the case. Many NIE 
scholars, time and again, emphasize that the existence of formal—or external—
institutions should not be fundamentally at odds with the existence of informal—or 
internal—institutions. If a society’s internal institutions do not support the factual 
implementation of tight (constitutional) constraints on its government, wonderful formal 
institutions will, most likely, have few beneficial effects. 
This section has both summarized and criticized Glaeser et al. (2004). Two points are 
worth emphasis: institutional measures should explicitly take the factual enforcement of 
the respective institution into account and the measures should be as objective as 
possible. Unfortunately, the four constitutional constraints relied upon by Glaeser et al. 
ignore the enforcement aspect. Measurement of institutions is key to an empirical of test 
of whether “institutions matter.” But in order to measure institutions, we first need a 
definition of what they are. The next section proposes such a definition and discusses a 
number of possible implications. 
3 Defining Institutions: A Proposal 
The NIE is a young field and still lacks a commonly agreed upon definition of 
“institutions.” The majority of scholars defines institutions as “the rules of the game.” 
North (1990, 3) defines them as “the humanly devised constraints that shape interaction. 
In consequence, they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, 
or economic.” His definition of institutions comprises implicit constraints, formal rules, 
and enforcement mechanisms. According to North, any formal rule is at least partially 
backed, supplemented, or contradicted by a number of implicit rules that can take the 
form of taboos, customs, traditions, codes of conduct, routines, conventions, and so 
forth (1990; 6, 43, 83). 
We propose a definition that explicitly takes into account the difference between 
informal and formal rules, on the one hand, and between rules and enforcement, on the 
other. It is inspired by Ostrom (1986, 5), according to whom, rules 
refer to prescriptions commonly known and used by a set of participants to 
order repetitive, interdependent relationships. Prescriptions refer to which 
actions (or states of the world) are required, prohibited, or permitted. Rules   8
are the result of implicit or explicit efforts by a set of individuals to achieve 
order and predictability within defined situations ... 
Two things are of particular note and deserving of emphasis in this definition: (1) 
“commonly known” implies that purely private rules do not qualify as rules and (2) 
rules are the result of human action, but not necessarily the outcome of deliberate 
human design.6
Institutions can then be defined as commonly known rules used to structure recurrent 
interaction situations that are endowed with a sanctioning mechanism. North (1990) 
distinguishes between formal and informal institutions, using the rule component as the 
criterion. I prefer to distinguish between internal and external institutions, where the 
classification depends on who sanctions rule-breakers: if rule-breaking is sanctioned by 
the state, the institution is an “external” one; if rule-breaking is sanctioned by members 
of society, the institution is “internal.” Within the internal institutions category, a more 
fine-grained taxonomy could again focus on who does the sanctioning: unorganized 
actors (due, e.g., to norms of reciprocity) or organizations (churches, chambers of 
commerce, private arbitration courts)?7 Internal institutions thus include mores, 
traditions, norms, and so forth. 
In their critique of frequently used measures of institutions, Glaeser et al. focus on the 
particular subset of “political institutions” without ever explicitly defining what these 
are. They do, however, explicitly refer to “democracy and other checks on 
government.” Other scholars also make a distinction between political and economic 
institutions. In Acemoglu et al. (2005a) economic institutions “determine the incentives 
of and the constraints on economic actors ….” Similarly, political institutions 
“determine the constraints on and the incentives of the key actors, but this time in the 
political sphere.” According to Acemoglu et al., political institutions allocate de jure 
political power. Political institutions determine economic institutions and the authors 
thus think of these institutions as hierarchically structured. 
Empirically, there are a number of differences between political and economic 
institutions, one of the more important being that economic institutions are generally 
very flexible regarding the structure of an interaction.8 Political institutions are more 
likely to specify a procedure: for example, elections are held every so many years, votes 
                                                 
6   Hayek attributes this statement to the Scottish moral philosopher Adam Ferguson (1767), 
who, however, attributes it to French Cardinal de Retz. 
7   Voigt and Kiwit (1998) contains a proposal for a more fine-grained taxonomy of internal 
institutions. 
8   A car can be bought using cash or a bank account; the transaction can be connected to a 
credit contract and so forth.   9
are transformed into delegates in a specific way, and so forth. Another difference 
between the two types of institutions is that in the case of economic institutions, 
sanctions for failure to comply with expected behavior (e.g., a contract) are more or less 
precisely specified ex ante. Sanctions for deviations from political institution 
expectations are rarely so explicit.9
Whereas North emphasizes the difference between formal and informal rules, the 
distinction between economic and political institutions uses the kind of interaction as a 
classification criterion, and we emphasize the difference between internal and external 
sanctioning of rule-breakers. At times, it is not easy to precisely differentiate between 
the political and the economic sphere (e.g., how to classify institutions constraining 
state owned enterprises?), the strategy is closely related to a standard classification 
often used by legal scholars: economic institutions structure interactions in which all 
involved parties act as private actors. In case of conflict, the state may act as a neutral 
arbiter (judges). These are interactions based on private law. However, interactions 
between private parties can also be nonvoluntary, for example, car accidents or theft. In 
these cases, the state usually acts on behalf of the victim. This type of interaction is not 
based on but, rather, adjudicated according to, criminal law (which is part of public 
law). Finally, there are interactions between government representatives and private 
actors, including taxation, regulation and the safety of citizens. These interactions are 
based on public law, as are interactions between representatives of the state. Interpreted 
like this, economic institutions are largely congruent with private law and political 
institutions with public law. 
4 Measurement Follows Theory: Assumptions and Implications 
The previous section clarified our notion of institutions. Now, we take the next step and 
discuss how to measure them. Measurement is always based on a number of 
assumptions concerning potential effects of the concept to be measured (here, 
institutions). Our proposals on how to measure institutions will be more convincing if 
the underlying assumptions are set out explicitly, which we now proceed to do. 
Institutions are supposed to constrain actors. A constraint implies that there are 
situations in which an actor who is subject to an institution prefers not to abide by the 
                                                 
9   For example, who is going to sanction a government for refusing to hold elections on the 
date specified in the constitution?   10
rule.10 If the rule reduces the number of allowed actions by an actor, then he or she 
might prefer not to be constrained by the rule because one of the nonallowed actions 
promises higher expected utility than the most attractive allowed action. In the absence 
of any sanction, then, the agent is expected not to conform to the rule. Enter sanctions 
and assume that an actor will never be sanctioned if he or she complies with the rules 
(we exclude judicial and other errors for the moment). The expected utility from 
breaking the rule needs to be greater than the product of the probability of being 
sanctioned times the utility loss of the sanction (the fine, the prison term, etc.). 
Assuming that the expected utility of rule-conforming behavior is higher than that of 
rule-breaking behavior, we expect that the agent will conform to the rule. 
To know to what degree institutions constrain behavior, it is insufficient to merely 
assign expected utilities to the situations “comply with rule/not be sanctioned” and “not 
comply with rule/be sanctioned.” We also want to know the expected utility of any 
rule/sanction combination. Ideally, this would allow identification of the “compliance 
elasticity,” defined as the percentage increase in compliance after a 1 percent increase in 
sanctions. 
Unfortunately, these expected utilities cannot be ascertained directly because the 
utilities of either complying with the rule or breaking the rule are not observable. 
Another problem is that most real-world actors will not be able to calculate the relevant 
expected utilities with any degree of certainty. Suppose a powerful and directly elected 
president considers canceling the next election. The margin of error in predicting how 
various groups will react—in other words, both the probability that they will act and the 
damage this will cause him—is extremely high. A high degree of uncertainty implies 
that actors will make “wrong” decisions every now and then. A (Nash) equilibrium is 
defined by the absence of incentives for any actor involved to unilaterally change his or 
her behavior. Uncertainty can induce actors to deviate unilaterally once but if their 
expectations from doing so are not met, they will likely soon revert to the equilibrium. 
Therefore, accurately measuring de facto institutions would seem to require observing 
behavior over a number of periods so as not to be misled by one-time deviations from 
equilibrium behavior. 
To this point, we have assumed that constraints are exogenously given. However, this is 
obviously not true if economic institutions are determined by political institutions. 
Political institutions are not exogenous either. In many countries, formal constitutional 
                                                 
10   For the sake of completeness, we add that institutions whose purpose is to solve (pure) 
coordination games do not need sanctions because noncoordination and the consequent 
reduction in payoff is sanction enough.   11
change requires supermajorities, but even constitutional constraints can be changed. If 
different rules promise higher benefits, people will lobby for the change. In short, the 
content of an institution is not permanent, at least not in the long run. 
Now that we have set out our definitions and provided a simple presentation of the 
relevant expected utility calculus, we now present a number of assumptions and 
implications. The attempt to measure institutions needs to be driven by an underlying 
theory. These theoretical considerations will thus have an influence on how we propose 
to make institutions measurable. 
Assumption 1: The effects of institutions are due both to their substantial content and 
their factual implementation. Institutions bring order to an otherwise chaotic world. 
They allow actors to form reasonable expectations about the future, which in turn 
enables actors to develop a longer time horizon, make long-term investments, engage in 
the division of labor, and so forth. This increased level of predictability can be achieved 
in two interdependent ways: (1) the substantial content of a rule (e.g., degree of 
protection of intellectual property) and/or (2) the degree of the rule’s factual 
implementation. For example, suppose the substantial content provides only slight 
protection of intellectual property, but the rule is meticulously enforced. Such an 
environment leads to predictability although the substantial content provides for little 
protection only. One can think of the two dimensions (the strength of the rule and the 
degree of its enforcement) as being in a substitutive relationship and some “iso 
predictability curve” as the result of their interaction. 
Implication 1: Both de jure and de facto institutions need to be measured; otherwise, it 
is impossible to separate the effect of the substantive content of a rule from the effect of 
enforcing a rule. Neglecting to measure de jure institutions implies that all of them are 
completely identical to each other, which is obviously not the case. 
Corollary 1: Many creators of indicators seem to assume simple linear relationships 
between an institution and some outcome. If such were indeed the case, then setting 
policy would be simple: just maximize or minimize (but never optimize) the 
institution’s content. Sadly, the real world is not that simple. For example, it is very 
likely that up to a certain level, the strength of a rule might have positive returns, but 
once past that level, the returns may be marginal or even negative. 
Assumption 2: The constraining effect of institutions largely depends on their factual 
implementation and enforcement. To ascertain whether institutions have a significant 
influence on any outcome variables, it is thus necessary to take their factual 
implementation and enforcement explicitly into account.   12
Institutions that are intended to formally constrain behavior substantively but whose 
rules are only weakly or erratically enforced are expected to constrain behavior to only 
a limited degree. Factual enforcement depends on the behavior of the enforcers. 
Implication 2: Measures aiming at including the factual enforcement of institutions need 
to reflect the behavior of the enforcers. These include, most obviously, judges, 
prosecutors, the police, and prison staff, but the press, lobby groups, and even the public 
at large often act as very effective enforcers. Once again, it turns out that measuring 
institutions is a messy affair. Glaeser et al. (2004) might say that this would imply a mix 
between institutional constraints on the one hand, and factual behavior on the other. 
And we would reply that behavior is indeed key to effect enforcement. Thus, if one is 
interested in factually enforced institutions, one must take behavior explicitly into 
account. 
Assumption 3: Factual behavior is likely determined by more than a single institution. 
Internal institutions can reinforce, but also weaken, the constraining effect of external 
institutions. 
Implication 3: Institutions serve to structure specific recurring interaction situations. To 
understand the behavior of actors involved in a specific interaction situation, one should 
attempt to identify all potentially relevant institutions, i.e., both formal and informal 
rules as well as both internal and external sanctions. To predict likely effects of 
institutions, it is insufficient to focus on the analysis of single institutions. In many 
situations, more than one institution is likely to affect the observed behavior. In such a 
case, it would be premature to attribute the effect (the observed behavior) exclusively to 
an external institution. One should also not ignore the possibility that external and 
internal institutions are in conflict, i.e., following an external institution will mean 
breaking an internal one or vice versa.11
Note that when taking into consideration a number of possibly relevant institutions, one 
must be careful not to dump them all together in a sort of “mixed bag” approach. It is 
important to try to measure each involved institution by itself so as to enable a more 
precise attribution of effects. This careful attention to detail will allow distinguishing 
                                                 
11    Voigt (2004) deals with the possibility and possible consequences of the coexistence of 
different property rights regimes.   13
those institutions that truly drive the effects from those that are only marginally 
relevant.12
Assumption 4: The factual enforcement of political institutions is often extremely 
precarious. Think of a hierarchy of institutions. Noncompliance with economic 
institutions can be sanctioned via political institutions. Noncompliance by members of 
the administration with administrative law can be challenged via administrative courts. 
But who enforces formal constitutional constraints against the government? Checks and 
balances are an attempt to reduce the expected utility of noncompliance. If legislators 
pass a new law that contravenes the constitution, constitutional review via a 
constitutional court can lead to annulment of the law. But what if the government 
simply ignores the court’s decision? 
Assumption 5: The factual enforcement of all institutions—and political institutions in 
particular—is a function of informal or internal institutions. In many, many cases 
sanctions for noncompliance by informal means is at least and sometimes far more 
effective than sanctioning by formal institutions. For example, if a merchant reneges on 
a contract, others are going to be less than eager to enter into contracts with him. He is 
thus punished by his potential partners. This sanctioning by actors other than the 
representatives of the state promises to be potentially most important with regard to 
political institutions: precisely because formal enforcement is highly precarious (see 
Assumption 4), political institutions will often only be factually enforced if there is a 
credible threat of being sanctioned informally for noncompliance. 
Suppose a government considers not complying with an annulment decision of a 
supreme court. If there is no outcry in the press, no opposition by organized interest 
groups, no protest by the people at large, then the government might very well expect to 
be better off by breaking some formal constitutional constraint. If, however, the press, 
interest groups, and the public do react to this government noncompliance, the expected 
utility of complying with the rule might be higher than that of breaking it. In other 
words, the factual constraining effect of some formal institution might depend on the 
presence of (complementary) internal institutions. To understand why a constitutional 
constraint is factually complied with in some countries but not in others, it is necessary 
to take informal institutions explicitly into account. If one is interested in understanding 
why constitutional constraints bind politicians in some cases but not in others, it is not 
                                                 
12   Some concepts, such as judicial independence, may not be directly observable. In such cases, 
measuring a number of single institutions can be complemented by identifying a latent and, 
hence, nonobservable variable made up of the various observable institutions.   14
sufficient to look at a particular rule in isolation—the institutional environment needs to 
be taken into account explicitly. 
Assumption 6: Internal institutions are largely exempt from intentional modification. 
Internal institutions are enforced without reliance on the state. Exclusion from a 
relevant group is a sanction that has worked for millennia. There are many such 
institutions embodied in the traditions, mores, and norms of societies. Domestic 
revolutionaries and foreign colonizers alike have often been surprised by the strength of 
these institutions. Since they do not rely on the power of the state for their enforcement, 
the state often has little influence on their substantive content. 
Implication 4: Suppose the factual implementation of external institutions crucially 
depends on a number of internal institutions (Assumption 5). Further suppose that 
internal institutions are largely exempt from intentional modification (Assumption 6). If 
the factual enforcement of external institutions does indeed depend on internal 
institutions, then external institutions should not be entirely at odds with internal 
institutions. The capacity to create external institutions that have a high chance of being 
factually implemented could thus be seriously constrained by the relevant internal 
institutions. The identification of an external institution that causes desired results is a 
necessary but hardly sufficient condition for the establishment of such an institution. 
Only if extant internal institutions are such that one can expect them to support the 
enforcement of the external institutions will establishment of the external institution be 
a success.13
In this section, we not only proposed a taxonomy of institutions, but also conjectured as 
to whether and to what degree formal constraints—such as constitutional rules setting 
up checks and balances—will be factually enforced. The results might seem 
discouraging with regard to the task of measuring institutions—is such a thing even 
possible? In the next section, we brighten up this gloomy outlook by showing that there 
are, indeed, pragmatic ways of measuring institutions. 
                                                 
13   There are, of course, a number of additional considerations in the decision to introduce an 
new external institution, including that the benefits will outweigh the costs. In this context, 
Williamson’s (1996, 195) delineation of efficiency is relevant: “An outcome for which no 
feasible superior alternative can be described and implemented with net gains is presumed to 
be efficient.”   15
5 A Pragmatic Approach to Measuring Institutions 
Before proposing a pragmatic approach to measuring institutions, let us review some 
basic preconditions to the task. First, the institutions need to be “perceptible” or 
“recognizable.” Generally, in regard to institutions formally passed as legislation this 
should not be a problem; however, in some countries legislation is published only after 
long delay, if at all. In countries without a written constitution, it is at times hard to 
ascertain what the constitutional constraints precisely are. Also, the precise content of 
many informal or internal institutions is never published, making it very difficult for 
outsiders to measure them. Ostrom (1996, 208) notes: “These rules may be almost 
invisible to outsiders, especially when they are well accepted by participants who do not 
even see them as noteworthy.” 
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The figure above illustrates how to clarify the relationship between institutions and 
factual behavior. It has the following implications. 
(1)  An actor subject to an institution needs to know the content of the underlying rule 
and understand its implications, i.e., the actor needs to be able to judge whether a 
behavior under consideration complies (or not) with the rule. 
(2)  An actor needs to be able to anticipate more or less correctly the possible 
sanctions in case of noncompliance with the rule. 
(3)  The potential “sanctioner” must be able to determine whether an individual has 
complied with the rule or not.   16
(4)  Finally, an external observer (such as an academic) must be able to judge all of the 
above! 
In addition, the assumption that individual behavior that conforms to a rule will never 
be sanctioned may be too optimistic. Judges who wrongly convict somebody who has 
complied with a rule are only one possibility. In many cases, actors who want to rely on 
institutions are sanctioned by regime representatives simply for having dared to use an 
institution. This could be the case with regard to freedom of opinion, for example. 
We now propose a pragmatic approach to measuring institutions. The central message is 
that it is essential to measure factually implemented institutions and their measurement 
is a lot less messy than might have been expected considering the previous discussion. 
We assume all actors have unobservable preferences; however, their behavior is 
observable. In addition, an external observer can evaluate whether their behavior is in 
conformity with a valid rule or not. It might even be possible to introduce a scale 
informing us about the “distance” between the rule and the factually observed behavior. 
It is further assumed that the larger the distance between the behavior to be expected 
according to the rule and the factually observed behavior, the less binding is the formal 
constraint. One needs, however, to be careful not to make the reverse statement. If 
behavior that is in compliance with the relevant rule is observed, one does not know 
whether compliance is due to the threat of a sanction, or simply reflects the preferences 
of the actor. 
Let us now make a number of pragmatic proposals on how to measure institutions. They 
are in line with the assumptions and implications developed in the last section, but 
presented in a different order. 
(1) To estimate differences between behavior expected according to some institution 
and factually observed behavior, we first need to select the institution in whose effects 
we are interested. Before starting to measure institutions, a clear and concise conception 
of the institution is essential. This sounds self-evident but, apparently, it is not. How 
else can one explain that measures for “democracy” or “the rule of law” are interpreted 
as measures of institutions? Neither “democracy” nor the “rule of law” are single 
institutions but are made up of dozens, even hundreds, of institutions. If one is interested 
in ascertaining the effects of specific institutions, one needs to measure these as a first 
step. If one believes that the effects are brought about by a whole system of institutions, 
one can aggregate all the single institutions into a more encompassing indicator later   17
on,14 but to find out what really drives the results, measures of single institutions are 
essential. 
Starting from a clear and concise theoretical delineation can often be interpreted as 
involving a value judgment. It has frequently been argued, for example, that “human 
rights” is a concept firmly rooted in Western civilization. If we are, indeed, interested in 
estimating the effects of various human rights, we need to delineate them as a first step. 
Some might respond that this is a sort of Western imperialism, but the only way to know 
whether human rights have the hypothesized effects is to delineate them as clearly as 
possible. 
(2) After having delineated an institution as precisely as possible, the next step consists 
in predicting the behavior that would be observable were actors to comply with the 
institution. If, for example, judges are appointed for 12 years, we would expect average 
tenure to be 12 years, with exceptions only for judges who voluntarily leave their 
positions early or die in office. It was pointed out above that formal constraints can be 
modified. For every single point in time, it is possible to identify behavior that accords 
with the formal rule. Spelling out de jure explicitly in the first place is necessary 
because otherwise we implicitly assume that all countries have identical rules. But some 
countries might not even try to secure private property rights in certain areas, such as 
real estate, in the first place. If this is clearly stated in the law and is also implemented 
as such, such a country should score high on predictability, as discussed above in 
Section 3. 
(3) Next, factually observed behavior needs to be measured. With regard to economic 
institutions, this will often appear almost impossible as the behavior of thousands or 
even millions of actors would need to be taken into account. Political institutions pose 
less of a problem. Usually, there is only one head of government and only so many 
ministers and thus the number of potentially relevant actors is relatively limited. In some 
instances, empirical complexity can be reduced by choosing an appropriate sample. One 
example is our own attempt to measure de facto judicial tenure (Feld and Voigt 2003). 
Many countries have thousands of judges, and it would be optimal to calculate factual 
average tenure based on all of them. This figure would then need to be corrected by 
considering voluntary early retirements, deaths in office, and so forth. If one is 
interested in a large cross-country sample, such a task could necessitate tracing the 
careers of hundreds of thousands of judges. To make the task less tedious, we focused 
                                                 
14   To synthesize measures of single institutions into more encompassing indicators, aggregation 
or weighting rules are needed. Often, specific theoretical arguments on how to weigh specific 
institutions are lacking. However, this is a follow-up problem and need not concern us here.   18
only on judges sitting in the highest court of a country.15 This simplification can be 
justified because the judiciary is structured hierarchically and if there are problems with 
factual tenure at the top of the hierarchy, it can have an influence on the entire legal 
development of a country. 
Whether political institutions are factually implemented cannot be answered based on a 
single point in time but must be looked at across some longer period. Suppose the 
constitution guarantees judges that their incomes cannot be reduced. Whether this 
institution is factually implemented will depend on whether it is complied with for 
several years or even decades. Likewise with tenure: whether factual tenure corresponds 
with  de jure tenure can be decided only after many years. To measure the factual 
implementation of institutions over very long periods also seems justifiable because 
predictability is not an overnight phenomenon. Rather, predictability is conjectured to 
be a function of the number of periods over which a de jure institution has been 
factually enforced. 
Deciding on the “optimal” period for measuring factual implementation of institutions 
involves various considerations: 
(a) For measurement of some institutions, there is a natural minimum period. For 
example, if we want to ascertain if the factual tenure of supreme court justices accords 
with their formally ensured tenure, we need to take at least the formal period into 
account (say 9 or 12 years). 
(b) The time period chosen can also have an impact on the number of available 
observations. Although it might be interesting to look at the implementation record of 
some institution for the last 100 years, if accurate observations cannot be made over the 
entire period, it might be more productive to look at a shorter period with better data.  
(c) If we want to use institutions as independent variables, we should make sure that 
they have been in place long enough to make an effect on our dependent variable 
plausible. Some institutions might need to be in place for a number of years before we 
can expect them to have any effects. 
(4) If one is interested in ascertaining the effect of institution “x” on variable “y,” it is 
crucial that measurement of x is not influenced by y. Again, this sounds self-evident, but 
many institutional measures disregard this basic rule. Many of the currently available 
measures are constructed on the basis of survey responses. Those surveyed can be local 
                                                 
15    Note that this presupposes that it is possible to determine the “highest court” without 
ambiguity, which might be difficult in a number of countries.   19
businesspeople, foreign investors, or others. Suppose the conjecture to be tested is that 
“secure property rights” are conducive to growth and income. When answering a 
question on the security of property rights in country a, the answers are very likely to be 
influenced by recent growth rates of that country or the country’s income level. If that is 
the case, the researcher is very likely to find a “significant” impact of x on y simply 
because the “measurement” of x is already done by taking y into account. 
How to avoid this pitfall? By relying on objective data—instead of subjective 
evaluations—as much as possible.16 Subjective evaluations are tainted by the theories, 
ideologies, prejudices, and so forth of the respondent. If one is interested in the “security 
of property rights,” it would seem more productive to describe a specific situation in 
which the respondent’s security is at stake and then inquire into how many days it 
would take and how much money would be involved to obtain one’s rights. This is the 
procedure used by Djankov et al. (2003) in their Lex Mundi project. The disadvantage 
is, of course, that general inferences about the “security of property rights” are not 
possible since it is likely that the security of property rights is not identical over all 
kinds of property.17
Collecting “truly” objective data is no mean feat. In many countries, the number of 
times that, say, any judge or prosecutor has been retired against his or her will is 
information not readily available. The availability of accurate information could be 
influenced by the degree to which freedom of the press is factually existent. 
(5) “Objectivity” in measurement implies that anybody repeating the identical 
measurement exercise should end up with exactly the same results. This is, however, 
                                                 
16    It is often assumed that there is no way to construct objective measures of corruption. 
However, there have been a number of attempts: for example, Golden and Picci (2005) 
propose comparing the quality of the physical infrastructure with the money that went into it. 
Controlling for differences in the natural environment, higher prices for identical quality 
imply higher levels of corruption. We are, however, not aware of any objective measure of 
corruption that would appropriate on a cross-country basis. 
  Subjective indicators do have their merits. After all, investment decisions are made by 
individuals whose subjective evaluations are crucial. Additionally, subjective indicators can 
implicitly control for a number of potentially relevant factors that might be difficult to 
control for using objective controls. 
17   Djankov et al. (2003) describe two paradigmatic situations (cashing in of a bounced check 
and getting rid of a nonpaying tenant) and then ask local lawyers how long it would take to 
have these cases settled. These measures are, in other words, only “hypothetical de facto” 
measures in the sense that it is the lawyers’ beliefs about how long it would take, not an 
objective measure of how long it really does take to have these cases settled.   20
only possible if the criteria, the coding rules, the various components of a measure, and 
so forth are all disclosed; in other words, if the construction of the measure is 
transparent. Unfortunately, some of the most frequently used current measures are 
completely nontransparent. The Freedom House indicators are a case in point. 
(6) To measure the “distance” between behavior expected according to the letter of the 
law and factually observed behavior, some measuring rod is needed. The appropriate 
measuring rod depends on the issue at stake: if it is essential that not a single deviation 
from the formal rule has occurred (e.g., an election entirely cancelled), then a simple 
dummy variable could suffice. Quite often, however, deviation from a de jure institution 
is a matter of degree. In such cases, the number of times that an institution has not been 
enforced over a decade or half a century can be measured. The various coding choices 
will also be affected by the variance of the number of deviations. This is also the case 
with regard to the issue of whether the measuring rod should have a linear or a 
logarithmic form. 
(7) Sometimes, we are interested in the effects of a notion that is broader than just one 
single institution, such as judicial independence or procedural formalism. In these cases, 
the notion one is interested in is often not directly observable. To make such latent 
variables observable, one can resort to factor analysis, in which a number of variables 
are synthesized into a (lower) number of factors, or principal components. Synthesizing 
different variables that are interrelated among each other by different levels of 
correlation into one indicator follows a theory-based algorithm. Reliance on simple 
arithmetic means between the variables making up the indicator is not necessary. 
Drawing on factor analysis implies an important theoretical conjecture, namely, that the 
correlations between the directly measurable variables can be causally ascribed to latent 
concepts. Factor analysis thus condenses the information contained in the original 
variables into latent factors by analyzing the common variation of the variables. The 
values of the factors in the single countries (the factor values) are presented as 
deviations from the mean, which is normalized to 0. Factor analysis allows us to keep 
our theoretical concepts clearly separate. Within the factors, it is not one single variable 
that drives the results but a mix of variables. Between the groups, factor analysis has the 
advantage of zero correlation between the factors. The relationship between the original 
variables and the factors (both in terms of strength as well as direction) is represented by 
so-called factor loadings, which can, in turn, be interpreted as correlations. 
Rosenthal and Voeten (2007) use factor analysis to identify the principal components of 
procedural formalism. In our own work, we use factor analysis to tease out the various 
dimensions hiding behind different indicators of federalism and fiscal decentralization 
(Blume and Voigt 2008).   21
Table 2, which is a simple 2x2 matrix, summarizes the most important point of this 
section: the most serious challenge in making institutions measurable lies in the dark 
cell. Although this will demand most resources, the cell shaded gray should also be 
taken into account as the cells cannot be compared without data for each of them. 
Table 2: Desirable Institutional Measures 
Way to measure:   
subjective objective 
De jure      Type of institution: 
De facto     
6 How Not to Measure Institutions 
This section contains a critical discussion of a few recently proposed attempts to 
measure institutions. 
(1)  Input measures. To compare, say, judicial systems, on the basis of input measures 
implicitly assumes that the inputs are transformed into outputs relying on the same 
production function everywhere. Countries that have achieved higher levels of 
efficiency will not be discriminated from countries having a highly inefficient 
judiciary. Attempting to make any inferences about quality of the judicial system 
based on, for example, the “budget allocated to the judicial system per inhabitant in 
2004” seems risky at best. Input measures can provide useful information on a 
number of topics, but without information on de facto implementation, they are 
difficult to use. An example of such measures are those provided by the so-called 
CEPEJ project of the European Council. 
(2)  Declared output if incentives to declare are not equally distributed. The U.N. Office 
on Drugs and Crime regularly publishes a Survey on Crime Trends and Operations 
of the Criminal Justice System. These surveys contain a great many highly 
interesting and relevant data, but they should not be used as a proxy for the 
functioning of any institution. To give an example: part of the Survey documents 
“crimes recorded in criminal (police) statistics, by type of crime including attempts 
to commit crimes.” The number of crimes is then normalized by 100,000 
inhabitants, which appears to give the data an aura of objectivity. Before putting 
too much trust into them, however, a number of questions should be dealt with: it 
might be necessary not only to control for population but also for the object of the   22
crime. In Romania, for example, only 5.5 attempts to steal cars per 100,000 were 
recorded. In Switzerland, this number is 899.47, which would imply that the 
likelihood of having one’s car stolen in Switzerland is 160 times higher than in 
Romania. Obviously, one should also correct for the number of cars. But this is not 
our main point: If the police are perceived as highly unlikely to ever catch a 
criminal and, moreover, they are even perceived as being corrupt, then the 
likelihood of even notifying the police is likely to decrease. If many people 
perceive a low institutional quality, they might have low incentives to declare or 
reveal x; a small denominator could then bias institutional quality and let it appear 
high precisely because it is perceived as being low! 
(3)  Highly aggregate measures. The Worldwide Governance Indicators initiated by the 
World Bank (e.g., Kaufmann et al. 2003) have been criticized extensively and 
specifically.18 They purport to measure such broad concepts as “voice and 
accountability,” “government effectiveness,” or “rule of law.” The main critique is 
that the indicators are not based on a thoroughly systematized concept but that the 
(implicit) definition of the various concepts is based on the available surveys. 
These change over time, which makes comparison over various years impossible. 
7 Conclusions and Outlook 
In this paper, we argue that measures of institutions should be precise, objective, and 
take into account de jure as well as de facto elements. We hypothesize that the factual 
enforcement of formal institutions is likely to be heavily influenced by a number of 
informal institutions. When trying to estimate the (economic) effects of institutions, this 
possibility should be reflected by incorporating a number of covariates proxying for 
these informal institutions; otherwise, the danger of omitted variable bias looms large. 
We also point out that measuring institutions combined with econometric findings 
showing their significance for explaining variation in dependent variables is absolutely 
no basis for assuming that it is possible to modify institutions at will. If their factual 
enforcement is, as hypothesized, indeed dependent on informal institutions, then these 
could be hard constraints preventing the factual enforcement of “better” or “more 
modern” institutions. 
But we will only know whether this is empirically correct after having estimated 
appropriate models. To do so, data are needed. As discussed, many of the currently 
                                                 
18   Among the critics are Arndt and Oman (2006), Knack (2006), Thomas (2006), and Kurtz and 
Schrank (2007a, 2007b). Kaufmann et al. (2007) is a reply to critics.   23
available institutional measures are not sufficient to refute the hypothesis that 
institutions do (not) matter. Major data collection exercises lie ahead. 
Below is a list of some areas for which better data could increase our knowledge. 
(1)  One of the first fields in which objective measures were introduced was central 
bank independence, the question being, of course, whether higher degrees of 
independence were causing lower inflation levels. Most of the indicators were, 
however, de jure. To my knowledge, the only proxy for the factual independence 
of central bank governors that is frequently used is their turnover rate. This is, of 
course, an important aspect of de facto independence, but there are others: How 
many times have the legal bases on which the bank operates changed over some 
given period? Have the qualification requirements for central bank governors 
(given that there are any) always been followed? How has the salary of the 
governors developed, or the budget of the entire bank? And so forth. 
(2)  The central bank can be viewed as an (independent) regulatory agency entrusted 
with the task of providing a stable money supply. Many of the reasons for making 
central banks independent also apply to other regulatory agencies, implying that 
the independence of these other agencies, as well as their accountability, could be 
measured using almost the same criteria as those used to measure the 
independence of central banks. 
(3)  Many actions by the judiciary can be interpreted as solving credible commitment 
problems involving actors wanting to make promises, be they private actors or 
government representatives. This means that frequently there are time-
inconsistency problems involved, and the independence of the courts can be 
analyzed using criteria very similar to those used for the analysis of central bank 
independence. My own indicators for de jure and de facto judicial independence 
are examples. However, it would be extremely helpful to have an organization 
such as the World Bank take up these indicators and extend them to more 
countries, double check the answers, and so forth. 
(4)  Depending on the resources available for data gathering, one might want to 
consider whether it is possible to measure some of the central institutions making 
up the rule of law. These could include its generality, its abstractness, and its 
certainty, along with more concrete provisions, such as the prohibition of 
retroactive legislation, the prohibition of expropriation without just compensation, 
habeas corpus, the protection of confidence, the principle of proportionality, and 
so forth.   24
Since collecting such data will require both money and expertise, large international 
organizations such as the World Bank are the best candidates for both the collection and 
dissemination of such data.   25
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